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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN AVIATION CASES
DAVID L.

CAMPBELL*

DARRELL

K.

CHERRY**

I.

INTRODUCTION

H

AVING REVIEWED several hundred decisions since the
report of 1980, the principal impression as to any overall
conclusion in the trend of jurisprudence is the rather phenomenal success that the defense seems to have obtained in the
last year in aviation litigation. This has been a particularly
good year for manufacturers, and component manufacturers,
with several successful motions for summary judgment. Similarly, there has been continued success for defendants in the
enforcement of contractual waivers between parties of relatively equal status. As this article will show, while there has
been an occasional deviation, the Second Circuit has recently
followed the Fifth and Ninth Circuits in important decisions
in such contractual enforcements.
The year 1980 also proved to be ripe for cases involving implied causes of action arising out of aviation statutes. While
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the Seventh Circuit has expanded such remedies, some district courts have restricted them.
The past year also confirmed a continuation of judicial
enforcement under the Warsaw Convention's technical
requirements.
The following article illustrates that the major air disasters
have resulted in interesting district and appellate court decisions, such as the Paris Air Crash of March 3, 1974, the JFK
Air Crash of June 24, 1975 and the Chicago Air Crash of May
25, 1979.
There have been further cases involving allegations of negligence against the United States for publication of aeronautical charts, and there has been a split in reported decisions,
with the Government winning some and losing others.
Aviation insurers generally have fared well in that reported
decisions reflect a continuance of courts' enforcement of coverage limitations and exclusions in aviation insurance policies.
Some of the more interesting decisions in the past year have
involved conflict of laws. Conflicts questions are very important to attorneys and litigants, in as much as underlying considerations usually are based principally upon strategy in
shopping for favorable substantive law. Conflicts questions
have largely arisen this past year in areas of great activity
such as the offshore North Sea exploration and drilling
operations.
The past year having been very litigious in aviation, the
principal point in this introduction is simply to refer the
reader to the following text.

II.

LIABILITY OF AVIATION MANUFACTURERS

The only federal appellate court decision involving liability
of manufacturers in the last year is, apparently, that of Bernard v. Cessna Aircraft Corp.,1 in which a directed verdict for
the defense was upheld on the ground that there was insufficient evidence to support strict liability against Cessna, absent any evidence that the alleged deficiencies contributed to
614 F.2d 1075 (5th Cir. 1980).
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a midair collision. In Gainous v. Cessna Aircraft Co.,' also
involving Cessna, the owner and insurer of the airplane
brought suit against Cessna on theories of negligent design,
manufacture and strict liability. The manufacturer moved to
dismiss, and the district court held that, while the owner of
the airplane stated a cause of action in negligence under Georgia law for property damage, the insurer lacked standing
under Georgia law to maintain a products liability action.
Such a decision was based on the fact that the insurer was a
corporation and under Sections 105-06 of the Georgia Code
Ann. "strict liability is applicable only in actions by natural
persons."

4

There were, however, several interesting decisions from district courts, and many of them involved the question of the
liability of component suppliers. Whether a manufacturer of a
component part, which was manufactured to specifications of
a third party, and in which there was no manufacturing defect, can be held liable for a design defect stemming from the
use to which the component part is put by the third party,
was at issue in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania decision in Orion Insurance Co.
v. United Technologies Corp.5 Actions were brought both by
the deceased pilot and the hull insurers for losses sustained in
the crash of a Sikorsky helicopter while it was involved in unloading operations. Named as defendants were both the manufacturer of the helicopter (UTC), and Amtel, Inc., a manufacturer of the "stationary star" component in the main motor
head assembly of the helicopter. The plaintiffs' allegations related to alleged defective design of the "stationary star," the
failure of which was allegedly the cause of the crash. Amtel
moved for summary judgment which was granted.
The court noted that Amtel's only involvement in this suit
was that it machined to supplied specifications the rough2 Id. at 1078.

3 491

F. Supp. 1345 (N.D. Ga. 1980).
1 Id. at 1348 (quoting Mike Bajalia, Inc. v. Amos Constr. Co., 142 Ga. App. 225,
227, 235 S.E.2d 664, 665 (1977)).
5 502 F. Supp. 173 (E.D. Pa. 1980).
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forged stars that were shipped to it by Sikorsky. Stating that
the plaintiffs had no evidence of a manufacturing defect in
Amtel's product, the court found the singular issue involved
in Amtel's motion for summary judgment to be whether or
not it could be held liable for design specifications provided
by a third party. Injecting concepts of negligence into Restatement (Second) of Torts Section 402A liability principles,
the court found that the issue boiled down to whether or not
Amtel was negligent in relying upon the specifications submitted to it by Sikorsky - whether the specifications were "so
obviously dangerous" that they should not reasonably have
been followed.' When this question must be answered in the
negative, the court found that Section 402A liability cannot be
imposed, simply because the manufacturer is not responsible
for the defective condition. 7 In short, the court found that it
was reasonable for Amtel to rely upon Sikorsky's specifications. This conclusion holds true both in the cases involving
allegations of defective design and failure to warn of the unavoidably unsafe condition of the manufactured product.
With regard to the latter, the court would not impose a duty
upon Amtel to undertake an independant investigation regarding the reason underlying Sikorsky's change in alloy composition specifications that was instituted shortly before the
manufacture of the affected part. Therefore, "Amtel did not
have the expertise required to know enough to give a
warning."
In Allied Aviation Fueling Co. of Minnesota v. Dover
Corp.,e the Supreme Court of Minnesota affirmed a directed
verdict in favor of a component supplier of a valve which had
been incorporated in a fueling system. The user brought suit
Id. at 176-77.
Id. The court cited Taylor v. Paul 0. Abbe, Inc., 516 F.2d 145 (3d Cir. 1975)
which held that a component manufacturer whose offer to install a safety guard on a
mill saw was refused by the owner was not liable for the resulting insuries, and Verge
v. Ford Motor Co., 581 F.2d 384 (3d Cir. 1978) which held that Ford was not responsible for the lack of a safety back-up buzzer on a truck chassis, since the finished
product was a garbage truck which reflected substantial work and modification by
another party.
o 502 F.2d at 178.
287 N.W.2d 657 (Minn. 1980).
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against the supplier and others for economic loss caused by
failure of the valve. The Minnesota Supreme Court held that
the supplier of the valve was not liable to the plaintiff, who
was a skilled and knowledgeable user, when the failure of the
component resulted from an application of force during use.10
As previously reported, the question of contractual waivers,
particularly between parties of generally equal stations, has
been a lively judicial subject. For example, in an action for the
value of a DC-8 destroyed in the November 28, 1972 air crash
of a Japan Airlines DC-8 (JAL) in Moscow, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals found that under California law, the
waiver of implied warranties, including strict tort liability, was
effective between corporations bargaining and negotiating
from positions of relatively equal strength." The waiver language was effective to negate liability arising from alleged negligence in failing to warn of a product defect.12 In so holding,
the court noted that its decision was consonant with lines of
jurisprudence emanating from the Ninth and Fifth Circuits.12
In doing so, the court rejected limitations asserted by JAL on
the ability to limit a manufacturer's tort liability and found
that where there is not intentional fraud involved, corporate
parties of equal bargaining strength may bargain away liability, even that liability arising from negligent acts, involving
knowledge imputed to the manufacturer. 14 Thus the disclaimer of implied warranties was valid.
As an additional matter, the court rejected McDonnell
Douglas' counter and cross-claims against JAL and its insurI Id. at 659. The accident also occurred at least two years after the user had some
knowledge that the design of the valve might be defective. Id.
" Tokio Marine & Fire Ins. Co. v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 617 F.2d 936 (2d Cir.
1980).
" Id. at 940.
" Id. at 939-40. See Scandinavian Airlines System v. United Aircraft Corp., 601
F.2d 425, 429 (9th Cir. 1979); Delta Airlines, Inc. v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 503
F.2d 239, 245-46 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 965 (1975); Fredonia Broadcasting Corp. v. RCA Corp., 481 F.2d 781, 797 (5th Cir. 1973); Southwest Forest Indus., Inc. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 422 F.2d 1013, 1020-21 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,
400 U.S. 902 (1970).
" Tokio Marine & Fire Ins. Co. v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 617 F.2d 936, 941 (2d
Cir. 1980).
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ers, applying the.California rule enunciated in American Motorcycle Association v. Superior Court,'5 which holds that a
tortfeasor who settles a plaintiff's claim in good faith is discharged from any claims of indemnity by a joint tortfeasor.
The court found irrelevant the fact that the claims settled by
JAL and its insurers were covered by the Warsaw Convention,
whereas McDonnell Douglas' liability was not. The American
Motorcycle rule, it found, applies in the tortfeasor situation
regardless of the applicability of the Warsaw Convention, and
the invocation of the Warsaw Convention does not prevent
settlement of such causes of action from being considered as
arising in tort, rather than contract.' e
In another case upholding the waiver of liability in connection with a contract for modification of an aircraft, including
both strict liability and failure to warn of inherent defects,7
factual issues in Islamic Republic of Iran v. The Boeing Co.1
were disposed of by summary judgment. Arising out of the
crash of a Boeing 747 owned by the plaintiff, Iran, this action
was brought for alleged design and manufacturing defects, as
well as negligence and breach of contract in failure to properly
train the crew and maintain the aircraft.' 8 The court granted
the summary judgment motion of defendants on the basis of a
waiver executed by the plaintiff and forming part of the contracts entered into with defendants.' 9 Indicating not only that
there may be sound reasons for not applying the doctrine of
strict tort liability to actions arising from transactions of two
large corporate powers,2 0 the court found the boiler plate dis20 Cal. 3d 578, 604-05, 578 P.2d 899, 915-16, 146 Cal. Rptr. 182, 198-99 (1978).
" Tokio Marine & Fire Ins. Co. v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 617 F.2d 936, 941-42
(2d Cir. 1980). The court noted that in Benjamins v. British European Airways, 572
F.2d 913 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1114 (1979), it was held that the War'"

saw Convention itself created a cause of action permitting recovery for travelers injured or killed in international flights, but that such languange did not preclude finding Warsaw Convention liability founded in tort as well as contract. Id. at 917.
" 15 Av. Cas. 18,189 (W.D. Wash. 1980).
I

Id.

Id. at 18,190.
so Id. (citing S.A. Empress De Viacas Aerea Rio Grandense v. Boeing Co., No. 76169M (W.D. Wash. January 14, 1977), decision after transfer,No. 76-0187 (C.D. Cal.
February 8, 1979); Keystone Aeronautics Corp. v. R.J.Enstrom Corp., 499 F.2d 146,
148-49 (3d Cir. 1974)).

1981]

RECENT AVIATION CASES

claimer and release language binding. The court simply stated
that the plaintiff was a "sophisticated and experienced sovereign state who must be held responsible for their voluntary
agreements." 2'
It seems that this was a good year for manufacturers' summary judgments, particularly for Beechcraft, and particularly
in the state of Louisiana. Beech obtained summary judgment
in its favor in Sievers v. Beechcraft Manufacturing Co."2 on
the basis that, in spite of extensive discovery, there was no
evidence to establish causation between any alleged deficiency
in the Beech Air King aircraft and its crash into Lake Pontchartrain, so as to entitle the plaintiff to recover on a theory
of either negligence or strict liability.' 8 The court noted that
res ipsa loquitur was inapplicable.' 4 The Sievers opinion also
cited the Fifth Circuit's decision of Bernard v. Cessna Aircraft Corp.,' 6 holding that in Louisiana strict liability cases,
plaintiff must show first, that the product was in normal use
and was unreasonably dangerous in that use and second, that
the injuries were caused by the defect.26 The court held that
the plaintiff had not introduced sufficient evidence to make a
jury issue of whether the collision was caused by a defective
7
product.2
Beech also had a motion for summary judgment affirmed by
the Fifth Circuit in Kroon v. Beech Aircraft Corp.28 The pilot/
owner alleged that Beech failed to design a fail-safe gust lock
system so that the aircraft could not be moved with the lock
engaged, and failed to warn of any possible danger.' The
Fifth Circuit affirmed the summary jdgment finding that the
pilot/owner's own negligence in failing to perform a preflight
check to ensure that controls moved freely was the proximate
15 Av. Cas. at 18,191.
497 F. Supp. 197 (E.D. La. 1980).
Id. at 201.
24 Id. at 202.
614 F.2d 1075 (5th Cir. 1980).
1Id.
at 1078.
27 Id.
"8628 F.2d 891 (5th Cir. 1980).
" Id. at 893.
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cause of the accident, rather than Beech's failure to design a
fail-safe gust lock system.3 0
Other manufacturers were also able to make use of summary judgment motions in recent cases. The Boeing Company
received summary judgment and thus escaped liability arising
from the crash on March 5, 1974 of an Air Force KC-135A
aircraft.31 Defining the material fact as one which "may affect
the outcome of the litigation," the court ruled that Boeing
had successfully demonstrated, through affidavits and deposition testimony, an absence of a genuine issue of material fact
as to each of several allegations made against it regarding
manufacture and design of the aircraft. 2 Finding that the
plaintiff had then failed to meet his burden of showing "specific facts" establishing such an issue, the court dismissed
Boeing from this litigation. However, co-defendant United
Technologies, manufacturer of the aircraft's four engines,
failed to extricate itself from the litigation. It failed to offer
evidence that the stalling of an engine on take-off is normal or
harmless.33
Bell Helicopter and a manufacturer of a component part of
the helicopter were also granted summary judgment under
theories of strict liability and breach of warranty in actions to
recover for loss of helicopters which crashed in Idaho, Washington and Peru." In Rocky Mountain Helicopters, Inc. v.
Bell Helicopter Co., 6 the district court applied Texas law as
to Bell, and Illinois law as to the parts manufacturer. Illinois
was the place of residence of this manufacturer. According to
Texas law, there could be no recovery under the theory of
strict liability against the manufacturer, and similarly, under
Illinois law there could be no recovery against the parts manufacturer.3 Last, the court held that the language of the con0 d. at 894.

Jurzysta v. Boeing Co., 15 Av. Cas. 18,173 (W.D. Wash. 1980).
Id. at 18,173-74.
" Id. at 18,178-79.
Rocky Mountain Helicopter, Inc. v. Bell Helicopter Co., 491 F. Supp. 611 (N.D.
Tex. 1979).
" 491 F. Supp. 611 (N.D. Tex. 1979).
" Id. at 619-20.
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tract between the parties, excluding express or implied warranty, was sufficient under Texas law.17 At this writing BorgWarner was still in the case (its motion to dismiss plaintiff's
breach of warranty being neither granted nor denied).
In Vasina v. Grumman Corp.,8 the defendant manufacturer moved for a judgment n.o.v. from a verdict of over a
million dollars awarded to the widow of a lieutenant in the
United States Navy killed when the aircraft in which he was a
bombardier-navigator crashed in a federal enclave in Oregon.
In its denial of the motion, the court noted the manufacturer's
defense that the crack in the wing was due to the Navy's failure to repair damage properly and that this failure was an
"intervening" cause which "superseded" the act of the manufacturer. 9 The court simply held that whether or not the
Navy's acts constituted an intervening or superseding cause
was a question of fact for the jury, and even if the jury found
the Navy's failure to make proper repairs was a cause of the
crash, the jury had sufficient evidence before it that the acts
of both the Navy and Grumman were "substantial contribut-

ing factors.

40

Continuing its refusal to follow the "second accident" doctrine, the Supreme Court of Mississippi in Pattillo v. Cessna
Aircraft Corp." absolved Cessna of liability occasioned by the
death of a passenger in the crash of a Cessna, attributable to
pilot error. In doing so the Mississippi court found that a
manufacturer has no duty to design a seat or harness assembly so as to withstand a high speed crash. The court noted the
growing majority allowing such actions and rejected the reasoning of cases such as Larsen v. General Motors Corp."2

III.

OWNER/OPERATOR LIABILITY

Although there were several cases involving the issue of
Id. at 622.
492 F. Supp. 943 (E.D.N.Y. 1980), afl'd, 644 F.2d 112 (2d Cir. 1981).
I at 944.
Id.
40 Id.
" 379 So. 2d 1225 (Miss. 1980).
'. 391 F.2d 495 (8th Cir. 1968).
'7
'
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owner/operator liability, in general these cases involved noncomplex factual issues rather than legal issues, and consequently, are reviewed in other sections of this paper.
IV. DOMESTIC TRANSPORTATION-AIRLINE LIABILITY
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals, in a panel vote of 1-11, upheld the imposition of liability against Eastern Airlines,
Inc. in connection with the crash of Eastern Flight 66 on June
24, 1975 at JFK International Airport. 48 The concurring opinion, written by Judge Waterman, upheld the district court's
imposition of liability, rejecting several grounds of error asserted by Eastern." The action was brought against Eastern
and the FAA's air traffic controllers by representatives of several victims of the crash. In the liability portion of the bifurcated trial, the United States chose, on the day of the trial, to
admit liability and thereby leave Eastern to defend the liability action alone. The jury found Eastern liable for its negligence in the crash and Eastern appealed, urging several
grounds of prejudicial error."5
The first substantial error asserted involved the trial judge's
refusal to allow Eastern to read into evidence several facts
stipulated to by Eastern and the plaintiffs, though not the
United States. These stipulations dealt with the knowledge
and duties of the air traffic controllers to report to pilots the
existence of severe weather conditions on runway twenty-two
prior to Flight 66's approach." In keeping with the concurring
opinion's characterization of the plaintiff's predicament as
walking a "tactical tight rope," the majority ruled that the
4s

In re Air Crash Disaster at John F. Kennedy Int'l Airport on June 24, 1975, 635

F.2d 67 (2d Cir. 1980).
"

Id. at 81.

Id. at 70.
41 Id. at 82-83. The plaintiffs, Eastern and the United States, formulated a statement of facts prior to this trial. During trial, the United States contested those portions of the statement which claimed that the Kennedy weather service and the room
41

controller had observed visually and on radar two severe weather cells on the final
approach course for Runway 22 but had never warned Eastern Flight 66. Further-

more, the stipulations had specified that it was incumbent upon the United States to
obtain specifics from preceding flights on Runway 22 and to change the runway use

from Runway 22.
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plaintiff could not be held to a stipulation made with an additional party not still present in the suit, and that "unintentional benefits" should not be bestowed upon the remaining
defendant in such an action.4

The dissent, however, argued

that when parties agree as to certain facts, their stipulation is
binding and must be given effect by the court.48 The stipulations agreed upon by the plaintiffs and Eastern regarding certain failures of the United States in its air traffic control duties should have been admitted, according to the dissent,
especially when the government conceded its liability. Since
Eastern's defense in the litigation argued that the air crash
was caused by the negligence of air traffic controllers alone,
the dissent found that Eastern should have been able to rely
on the stipulations vis-a-vis the plaintiffs, and that their rejection was highly prejudicial to Eastern's defense. "
Eastern also attacked portions of the trial court's instructions to the jury, which stated that the air traffic controllers of
Eastern Flight 66 "were expected to provide current weather
information," 50 but that the controllers' duty to warn did not
relieve the pilots of their primary duty and responsibility for
the flight.5 1 Eastern characterized this instruction as prejudicial error because the instructions failed to properly define the
duty of the air traffic controllers to inform themselves of dangers on or near the runway, and to communicate this information to the pilots.2 In this assessment the dissent agreed, but
the majority found that the instructions on the whole were
proper."
Eastern objected to the jury charge concerning res ipsa loquitur, contending that when an airplane crash occurs and is
" 635 F.2d at 80.
" Id. at 83.
4'Id. at 84.
" Id.
at 74.
" Under the court's charge, the pilot had a primary duty and responsibility to be
aware of danger that can be detected with the pilot's eyes or his instruments. If the
pilot cannot see the trouble, or detect it on his instruments, he will not be held to
have a primary duty to be aware of the danger if he is not warned of it by the controllers. Id.
Id. at 85.
" Id.
at 74.
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caused by specific, identifiable factors, i.e., wind shear, res
ipsa simply cannot apply.54 The dissent accepted Eastern's
position wholeheartedly, but the majority disagreed, finding
that the cause was not clear, that even if an error occurred, it
was not prejudicial in light of the fact that the jury was also
charged as to general negligence principles. The majority
was not persuaded by the dissent's conclusion that the exclusive control prerequisite, implicit in a res ipsa application,
had cut to the very heart of Eastern's defense.
The Federal Aviation Administration and the National
Weather Service were exonerated from liability in connection
with the crash of Pan American Flight 803 at the Pago Pago
International Airport on January 20, 1974. 5 7 Flight 803
crashed 3,865 feet short of the runway while making an instrument landing system (ILS) approach at 23:41 hours. The
court found Pan American solely liable for the crash, which it
attributed to various acts of negligence committed by the
flight crew." The court found that the pilot had unreasonably
failed to engage 500 flaps until two minutes after passing the
glide slope intercept and had held his 150 knot approach
speed. Further, the pilot failed to call out his sink rate after it
exceeded 800 feet per minute and concomitantly descended at
a rate of over 1,900 feet per minute.5 9 Finally, the court found
that the pilot should have been aware of the aircraft's improper stabilization during its approach and that he should
have attempted a missed approach prior to descending below
decision height.6 0
The denial of punitive damages in wrongful death actions in
states allowing such damages in other personal injury actions
was subject to an unsuccessful constitutional attack in the
" Id. at 77.
68 Id. The court concluded that "based on the jury charge read as a whole, [it] was
of the opinion that any possible error . . . caused by the res ipsa change was remedied ..
" Id.
8I

Id.

In re Air Crash Disaster at Pago Pago, American Samoa on January 30, 1974, 15
Av. Cas. 18,403 (C.D. Cal. 1980).
8 Id.
at 18,418.
" Id.
at 18,415.
00 Id. at 18,416.
"
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Ninth Circuit. The court reversed the decision of the district
court in In re Paris Air Crash of March 3, 1974. Applying
the "minimum scrutiny" standard of review, the court found
that a rational relationship existed between the limitation of
punitive damages in wrongful death actions and the state interests involved.62 In enacting the wrongful death act, the
court found that the state effected its purpose of providing'
compensation for economic loss and the deprivation of consortium suffered by certain classes of survivors. The court found
that denying the recovery of punitive damages in such actions,
was consistent with the compensatory nature of the wrongful
death recovery scheme as set up by the California Legislature." The court, therefore, concluded that the state legislature was within its discretion in avoiding excessive damages
assessed against defendants under its wrongful death recovery
scheme.'
In a spin-off from litigation arising from the Chicago air disaster of May 25, 1979, the court in DeYoung v. McDonnell
Douglas Corp.,65 rejected claims asserted under Illinois law by
the heirs of a crash victim who were seeking recovery for
mental anguish experienced by the decedent prior to the aircraft's impact with the ground. Noting the Illinois Supreme
Court's policy reversal in 1974 when it first allowed a survival
action in favor of a decedent's survivors for the conscious pain
and suffering of the decedent, the court found itself constrained to limit such recoveries to pain and suffering "di' In
rectly connected with a contemporaneous bodily injury."66
partially granting McDonnell Douglas Corporation's (MDC)
61622 F.2d 1315 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 387 (1980). The court in
Hempel v. American Airlines, Inc., 102 Misc. 2d 563, 423 N.Y.S.2d 778 (1979) came to
a similar conclusion, rejecting the logic of the district court's decision in the reported
case and holding that New York's similar denial of punitive damages in wrongful
death actions was constitutional. 423 N.Y.S.2d at 779.
:2 622 F.2d at 1319.
3 Id. at 1323.
04 Id.
507 F. Supp. 21 (N.D. Ill. 1980).
Id. at 23. In doing so, the court followed previous Illinois jurisprudence to this
effect. See Murphy v. Martin Oil Co., 56 Ill.
2d 423, 308 N.E.2d 583 (1974); Carlinville
Nat'l Bank v. Rhoades, 63 Ill. App. 3d 502, 380 N.E.2d 63 (1978).

14
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motion for summary judgment, the court rejected the pre-impact anxiety claim but found that the decedent's representatives could seek recovery for injuries suffered by the decedent
after impact and before death ensued. 7 The court rejected
MDC's contention that, as a matter of law, the interval between impact and death was so small that no recovery could
,be had. 58 However, the court noted that the jury must consider the duration of the pain and suffering in assessing the
amount of damages to be awarded. 9
Litigation stemming from the 1977 crash of two Boeing
747's in the Canary Islands raised an interesting issue involving the extension of the California-recognized cause of action
for damages arising from the mental anguish suffered by
third-parties who view the death or injury of another person.70
In Burke v. Pan American Airways, the court rejected the
claim of the twin sister of a crash victim in her suit for damages arising out of her "extra sensory empathy" which allegedly occurred contemporaneously with the death of her sister
several thousand miles from the plaintiff's California abode.7
Applying the seminal California decision of Dillon v. Legg,7
and post Dillon jurisprudence7 8 which construed the Dillon
"sensorily perceived" ' requirement as allowing only those actions arising out of visual or auditory perception of the injury,
the court found recovery for extra sensory perception would
extend liability to defendants for injury that was "remote and
unexpected, '76 and against which the Dillon decision stood as
contrary precedent.
507 F. Supp. at 23.
'8 Id. at 24.
17

9 Id.
70 Burke

v. Pan American World Airways, Inc., 484 F. Supp. 850 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
Id. at 850-51.
"' 68 Cal. 2d 728, 441 P.2d 912, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72 (1968). The Dillon court found
that mental anguish suffered by a close relative who was not present at the scene of
the accident and who did not directly perceive it through either auditory and/or visual perception did not constitute the type of harm that was "reasonably foreseeable."
7' See Justus v. Atchison, 19 Cal. 3d 564, 565 P.2d 122, 139 Cal. Rptr. 97 (1977).
71 484 F. Supp. at 851.
75 Id. at 852.

71 Id. The Dillon court set forth the following factors:

(1) Whether the plaintiff was located near the scene of the accident as
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The year 1980 was one ripe with judicial consideration of
claims for implied private causes of action under various federal aviation statutes. For example, on remand from the
United States Supreme Court to the Seventh Circuit for reconsideration of its original decision in light of Touche Ross &
Co. v. Redington,77 the Seventh Circuit again found that a private remedy may be implied in favor of air charter travelers
7
for losses incurred at the hands of insolvent tour operators 8
under section 401(n)(2) of the Federal Aviation Act of 1958. 7
Faced with a "paucity" of legislative history on this question,
the majority still found themselves "compelled" to conclude
that a private remedy should be implied from this section
under the guidelines recently enunciated by the United States
Supreme Court in Touche Ross and Cannon v. University of
Chicago,8 0 as well as under the seminal decisions of Cort v.
Ash,8 1 J.L Case Co. v. Boraks8 and Sante Fe Industries v.
Green."3 The Bratton court found that the intent of section
401(n)(2) of the Act was designed "specifically to provide an
enforceable remedy to individual air charter travelers against
insolvent tour operators by providing compensation for their
4
loss from a financially responsible third-party."'
In a strenuous dissent, Justice Bauer argued that the statute itself evidences no intent on the part of the legislature to
provide any private rights to an identifiable class, and that
the statute does not even proscribe any conduct as unlawful.8 5
contrasted with one who was a distance away from it. (2) Whether the
shock resulted from a direct emotional impact upon the plaintiff from
the sensory and contemporaneous observance of the accident, as contrasted with learning of the accident from others after its occurrence.
(3) Whether plaintiff and its victim were closely related, as contrasted
with an absence of any relationship or the presence of only a distant
relationship.
68 Cal. 2d at 739-41, 441 P.2d at 920, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 79-81.
77 442 U.S. 560 (1979).
78 Bratton v. Shiffrin, 635 F.2d 1228 (7th Cir. 1980).
79 49 U.S.C. § 1371(n)(2) (1977).
441
422
82 377
83 430

80
81

U.S.
U.S.
U.S.
U.S.

677 (1979).
66 (1975).
426 (1964).
462 (1977).

0' 635 F.2d at 1230.
85 Id. at 1233. (Bauer, J., dissenting).
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Instead, the dissent argued, the statute, by its terms, merely
authorizes the CAB to require a supplemental air carrier to
file a performance bond or an equivalent security arrangement
and, according to guidance supplied by the most recent Supreme Court decisions, that no private cause of action should
be implied from the statute's language, focus, and a "deafening legislative silence."' 6 The dissent further argued that,
since Congress had provided express remedies for violation of
other sections of the Act, 7 it would have expressly provided
for the action asserted by the plaintiff had it intended to create one.88
Concerning the question of whether the Federal Aviation
Act creates a private cause of action in favor of those excluded
from using an air navigation facility which has received federal funds for improvements, (contrary to its prohibition s
against granting exclusive rights awarded for such use), the
United States District Court for the Western District of New
York in Guthrie v. Genesee County" answered in the negative. The court did recognize, however, the plaintiffs' right to
proceed under the Sherman Anti-Trust Act for an alleged restraint of trade.' 1 With regard to the implied private right of
action asserted to flow from the Federal Aviation Act, the
court, applying Cort v. Ash" and its progeny, found no intent
on the part of Congress to create a private right of action by
passing the statute. Stating that the statutory provision was
not enacted for the benefit of an "especial class" of which the
plaintiffs are members,'" the court noted both the absence of
any language implying such a cause of action under this section and the fact that Congress could have easily done so, in
" Id. at 1234.
49 U.S.C. §§ 1471-1472, 1482, 1487 (1977).
635 F.2d at 1236.
a*See 49 U.S.C. § 1349(a), as amended by 49 U.S.C. §§ 1344-1351 (West Supp. III
1979), which provides in pertinent part: "There shall be no exclusive right for use of
any landing area or air navigation facility upon which Federal funds have been
expended."
" 494 F. Supp. 950 (W.D.N.Y. 1980).
Id. at 958.
" 422 U.S. 66 (1975).
494 F. Supp. at 959.
87 E.g.,
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light of the private cause of action established in several other
portions of the act.9 4 Further, considering the third underlying
factor articulated in Cort v. Ash, the question of whether a
private remedy is necessary to effectuate the purpose of the
section,95 the Guthrie court found that "no strong remedial
purpose" was reflected in the applicable section of the Federal
Aviation Act 96 and that no "compelling need" for the court to
imply a remedy existed in the case."
Plaintiffs also asserted an anti-trust cause of action which
the court did find could be maintained by corporate entities
who were excluded from the use of the county facility by the
airport operator, who had been awarded a virtually exclusive
use contract by the county. 8 In so ruling, the court rejected
the "state action" exemption99 enunciated in Parker v.
Brown100 and explained in City of Lafayette v. Louisiana
Power & Light Co."'1 The court found that the New York
Legislature had not contemplated the type of action engaged
in by the defendants, nor had it manifested a policy to displace competition in airport operation with regulation or monopoly public service. 102 Therefore, the state-granted power
given to the counties to facilitate regulation of municipal airports was found insufficient to support adoption of the granting of exclusive agreements as part and parcel of the state
government's sovereign acts. The state, in short, had not "actively supervised" this type of behavior and therefore it was
subject to the strictures of the Anti-Trust Act.103
In another case which upheld an implied right of action
under the Federal Aviation Act, the court in Chumney v.
" Id.
ld.
I'

49 U.S.C. § 1349(a), as amended by 49 U.S.C. §§ 1344-1351 (West Supp. III

1979).
9 494 F. Supp. at 960.
Id. at 958.
IId.
"o 317 U.S. 341 (1943).
101 435 U.S. 389 (1978).
102 494 F. Supp. at 956. See California Retail Liquor Dealers Ass'n v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 100 S. Ct. 937 (1980).
o1 494 F. Supp. at 956.
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Nixon,104 afforded an international flight passenger a private
cause of action for damages resulting from an assault by a fellow passenger during a flight over the high seas. The plaintiff
also brought claims against the travel agency which booked
the tour and against the air carrier. In evaluating these claims,
the court found that neither of the defendants was charged
with the duty to provide police services aboard the flight. 0 5
The court intimated, however, that a cause of action might
exist for a breach of regulations regarding the boarding or service of alcoholic beverages to persons who are or appear to be
intoxicated, 0 6 if a causal connection between such violation
10 7
and the injuries suffered could be established.
In Kodish v. United Airlines, Inc., 0 8 the plaintiff alleged
that his application for a United flight crew position was rejected because of age discrimination, admittedly utilized by
United in its flight crew hiring practices. 10 9 The plaintiff's suit
was premised upon a private right of action arising under either (1) The Federal Aviation Act of 1958, 49 U.S.C. section
1302(a)(3) and section 1374(b); (2) The Civil Rights Act of
1866, 42 U.S.C. section 1901, or (3) Executive Order 11141, 29
Fed. Reg. 2477 (1964).110 The Tenth Circuit held that the
plaintiff's complaint failed to state a claim for which relief
could be granted under any of the three grounds cited."' The
court concluded that, under Cort v. Ash, no implied private
cause of action existed under these statutes and that the executive order, which declared the policy against age discrimination in the hiring practices of federal contractors, failed to
12
vest plaintiff with a cause of action.'
In Croce v. Bromley Corp.,1"3 two issues of interest were
104 615 F.2d 389 (6th Cir. 1980).
'o'

Id. at 395.

Id. at 395 n.2 (citing 14 C.F.R. § 121.575 (1979)).
615 F.2d at 395.
108 628 F.2d 1301 (10th Cir. 1980).
09 Id.
at 1302. United Airlines required applicants to be between the ages of 21
and 29.
107

110 Id.
'"
Il

Id. at 1302-03.
Id. (citing Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66 (1975)).
623 F.2d 1084 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 1516 (1981).
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raised in the Fifth Circuit's opinion. The court affirmed the
imposition of joint and several liability on Mustang Aviation,
Inc., a charter airline, and Bromley Corporation, a smaller
charter service substituted by Mustang to transport singer
Jim Croce and his entourage. " The wife and son of the musical group's road manager brought suit for wrongful death as a
result of the subsequent airplane crash. The court held that
the charter airline, which had contracted to transport the
Croce group but had failed to disclose the substitution of the
smaller charter service and its pilot, was estopped from denying that the smaller service was
its agent and thus that Mus11 5
tang was liable for its acts.
The court also dismissed the defendant's argument that the
contract of carriage was voided by an illegal purpose, inasmuch as the evidence showed the deceased to be carrying a
small amount of marijuana on his person at the time of the
crash. The court found that a common carrier is not entitled
to avoid the high standard of care it owes its passengers "because of some unknown or undisclosed conduct of the passenger, merely incidental to the trip, that happen[s] to be in violation of some statute or regulation."'1 6 The decedent's
possession of a small amount of marijuana was ruled immaterial for the purpose of determining the degree of care that the
common carrier owes its passengers.117
The question of the legal significance of an airline or taxi
service subcontracting or arranging for passengers to travel
with another airline or air taxi service, as in Croce,118 was the
principal issue in Roberts v. Gonzales.119 In Gonzales, Caribbean Executive Airline, Inc. had utilized the charter services
of defendant, Conquest Airways, Inc. in transporting some of
its passengers. The Conquest flight crashed into two homes
shortly after takeoff, resulting in the death of three of its nine
"

Id. at 1085.

15 Id. at 1088.

116 Id. at 1091 (quoting Williams v. Shreveport Yellow Cab Co., 183 So. 120 (La. Ct.

App. 1938)).
"7

Id. at 1091.

RI

623 F.2d 1084 (5th Cir. 1980), cert denied, 101 S. Ct. 1516 (1981).
495 F. Supp. 1310 (D.V.I. 1980).

"'
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passengers as well as four occupants of one of the homes. The
court found Caribbean liable to all plaintiffs based on its nondelegable duty as a common carrier, and even though Conquest was not an authorized agent, it was held to be a corporate personality with apparent authority to act on Caribbean's
behalf under Section 8 of the Restatement (Second) of

Agency.120
Of interest to those air carriers who arrange vacation packages for their customers is the Illinois Appellate Court decision in United Airlines, Inc. v. Lerner"' which found that
United Airlines had no duty to warn the plaintiffs, who had
obtained a ski vacation package through United, of the likelihood of an avalanche which closed access roads to the ski
lodge, thereby cutting in half the anticipated amount of skiing
available to the vacationers.1 22 Although the court did find
that the airline was acting on its customer's behalf as a travel
agent and that it owed a "duty of loyalty," the court also
found that the airline could not be charged with a duty of
'28
being "prescient.'
United Airlines can also vouch for the determination of unhappy non-smoking passengers, even when they are seated in
a first class non-smoking section. In Ravreby v. United Airlines, Inc.,' 2 a physician/attorney passenger sued United to
recover for discomfort suffered as a result of smoking by the
other passengers in the first class section. When he lost in the
district court, he appealed to the Supreme Court of Iowa,
which held that, while United owed the duty to provide a safe
120 Id. at 1312. Section 8 of the Restatement (Second) of Agency provides as follows: "Apparent authority is the power to affect the legal relations of another person
by transactions with third persons, professedly as agent for the other arising from
and in accordance with the other's manifestations to such third persons." RESTATE-

MENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 8 (1958).

87 Ill.
App. 3d 801, 401 N.E.2d 225 (1980).
Id. at 227.
123 Id. at 228.
."'293 N.W.2d 260 (Iowa 1980). The CAB has expanded its rule making power
over smoking to include a possible ban on all smoking, or in the alternative, to rescind the CAB smoking regulations and leave it up to each airline to establish a
smoking policy. The Board has sought comments on whether the federal smoking
rules should be eliminated or whether they should be transferred to another agency.
Comments were due by March 25, 1981. 46 Fed. Reg. 11,827 (1981).
"1I
"2
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environment for travel, evidence of the airline's compliance
with the CAB smoking regulations was sufficient to show that
the airline had not breached its duty under either CAB regulations (which did not have primary jurisdiction over the
claim) or under Iowa law.1"
In an action for damages brought by a "bumped" passenger,
the court in Christensen v. Northwest Airlines, Inc.,12 construed literally the "denied boarding compensation" provision
contained in 14 C.F.R. section 250.6(b)1 27 and found that a
passenger who accepts alternate transportation after being
bumped from a confirmed flight is barred from claiming liquidated damages.129 The court reasoned that the acceptance of
alternative transportation is in lieu of denied boarding compensation 129 so that the liquidated damages bar contained in
14 C.F.R. section 250.7180 is triggered.

In Landy v. FAA, 131 the Second Circuit reversed the imposition of a $430,000 civil penalty which the lower court assessed
after the jury found that the defendants had operated an aircraft for compensation or hire without following the more
stringent requirements of Part 121 of the Federal Aviation
Regulations (FAR). 8 2 The FAA brought this action for imposition of civil penalties, alleging that the defendants had improperly skirted regulations in operating a charter service
which utilized sham lease and sublease agreements. The court,
in reversing, found substantial error in the trial court's
"'

293 N.W.2d 260 (Iowa 1980).

633 F.2d 529 (9th Cir. 1980).
14 C.F.R. § 250.6(b) (1981) provides that a passenger is ineligible for denied
boarding compensation if the carrier arranges transportation, accepted by the passenger, which is scheduled to arrive within two hours of the planned arrival time of the
originally scheduled flight.
128 633 F.2d at 530.
129 455 F. Supp. 492, 494 (D.H. 1978), aff'd, 633 F.2d 529 (9th Cir. 1980).
.30 14 C.F.R. § 250.7 (1974) (current version at 14 C.F.R. § 250.4(b) (1981)), pro120

.21

vides that acceptance of denied boarding compensation under section 250 constitutes
"liquidated damages for all damages incurred by the passenger as a result of the carrier's failure to provide the passenger with confirmed reserved space."
:3 635 F.2d 143 (2d Cir. 1980).
13
14 C.F.R. §§ 121.1(a)(5), 121.3(0, 121.45(b), 121.75(a), 121.111, 121.123, 121.125,
121.163, 121.291(a), 121.369(a), (b)(1)-(9), (c) (1980).
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charges to the jury and in its special interrogatories. 18 Relevant FARs were neither read nor explained to the jury but,
instead, were paraphrased in special interrogatories that failed
to pinpoint identity, time, place or flight. The instructions
and interrogatories further failed to distinguish between the
three defendants involved, thereby making all defendants liable for the violations committed by any of the defendants.'
The court found that in order .to impose a severe civil penalty
on a defendant, the requisite factual findings necessary to
support each component part of such penalty cannot be made
without reference to the applicable regulations, and that the
jury must be specifically instructed as what those regulations
1 5
are. 8
V.

INTERNATIONAL TRANSPORTATION -

WARSAW SYSTEM

With some notable exceptions, 1980 saw a continuation of
the judicial enforcement of the Warsaw Convention's technical requirements. In Whale v. British Airways,' 6 for example,
a case involving a damage claim for loss of baggage during a
flight which the plaintiff boarded using a ticket which he had
altered to reflect his name, rather than that of the original
purchaser, the court found that no liability could attach under
either the Warsaw Convention or tariffs filed with the FAA by
the defendant airline.8 7 Similarly, the Convention's two-year
statute of limitations "8 precluded the plaintiff's claim for
damage flowing from an eight hour delay in providing international transportation from Rome to New York in the case of
Rullman v. Pan American World Airways, Inc.8 9 The action
was filed over two and one-half years after the alleged
incident.
In Greeley v. KLM Royal Dutch Airlines,4 an unsuccessful
1
134

635 F.2d at 145-46.

Id.

"3 Id. at 147.
131

137
138

15 Av. Cas. 18,122 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1980).
Id.
49 U.S.C. § 1502 (1976).

'" 15 Av. Cas. 18,522 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1980).
0 85 F.R.D. 697 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
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attempt was made by a passenger, alleging loss of $1,650 of
jewelry from his baggage, to bring a class action on behalf of
all KLM passengers who had suffered baggage losses that
were subsequently settled for $20 per kilogram,14 1 pursuant to
KLM policy. The plaintiff also contended that the Warsaw
limitation did not apply to his claim because of the failure on
the part of the carrier to issue baggage checks that complied
with Article 4(4)'s requirements.1 42 The plaintiff, when offered
$20 by KLM in settlement of his claim, refused and instead
brought suit on behalf of himself and the above-described
class. Dismissing the class action claims, the court found that
the plaintiff could not "fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class" as required under Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 23(a)(4), because his recovery would not require a
"I Id. at 698-99. Article 22(2) of the Convention limits the carrier's liability for
properly checked baggage to 250 francs per kilogram, unless a special declaration of
value is made and additional charge paid. Convention for Unification of Certain
Rules Relating to InternationalTransportation by Air, Oct. 12, 1929, 49 Stat. 3000,
T.S. 876, 137 U.N.T.S. 11 [hereinafter cited as Warsaw Convention of 19291.
142 85 F.R.D. at 699. Article 4 provides:
(1) For the transportation of baggage, other than small personal objects of which the passenger takes charge himself, the carrier must deliver a baggage check.
(2) The baggage check shall be made out in duplicate, one part for the
passenger and the other part for the carrier.
(3) The baggage check shall contain the following particulars:
(a) The place and date of issue;
(b) The place of departure and of destination;
(c) The name and address of the carrier or carriers;
(d) The number of the passenger ticket;
(e) A statement that delivery of the baggage will be made to the
bearer of the baggage check;
(f) The number and weight of the package;
(g) The amount of the value in accordance with article 22(2);
(h) A statement that the transportation is subject to the rules
relating to liability established by this convention.
(4) The absence, irregularity, or loss of the baggage check shall not
affect the existence or the validity of the contract of transportation
which shall nonetheless be subject to the rules of this convention. Nevertheless, if the carrier accepts baggage without a baggage check having been delivered, or if the baggage check does not contain the particulars set out at (d), (f), and (h) above, the carrier shall not be entitled
to avail himself of those provisions of the convention which exclude or
limit his liability,
Warsaw Convention of 1929, supra note 141.
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showing of fraudulent inducement to settle, an element cru43
cial to all members of the purported class.1
An example of a very harsh application of the Convention's
imposition of liability upon carriers under Article 18 is found
in Kinney Shoe Corp. v. Alitalia Airlines. 4 There the court
granted summary judgment in favor of the consignee of a
shipment of shoes that was stolen from the surface transportation agent's trucks when they were hijacked during the journey to the carrier's terminal.1 4 5 The defendant airline unsuccessfully resisted the summary judgment by arguing that a
substantial issue of fact existed with regard to whether or not
"all reasonable measures to avoid the loss"'"6 were taken, or
that it was "impossible to take such measures,' 4 the two
statutory grounds relieving the carrier of liability for damage
or loss to cargo. Noting that the summary judgment is a "premier procedural device[] capable of terminating litigation
quickly, efficiently and fairly,' ' 4 8 the court found the plaintiff
had made out a prima facie case of liability by showing that
the cargo was entrusted to an agent of the carrier and that,
due to theft, it was never received by the consignee.'
The
crucial issue was whether an "occurrence" had taken place
during the transportation and, if so, whether the carrier had
borne his burden of showing that he had taken "all reasonable
measures to prevent the loss at issue."' 5 0 Ostensibly basing its
decision on the failure of the defendant to come forward with
affidavits or other positive evidence, rather than relying on
the conclusory allegations in its pleadings, the court rejected
the carrier's argument that the plaintiff faced a more substantial proximate causation problem where criminal intervention
was the cause of the loss."'1

148

85 F.R.D. at 700.
15 Av. Cas. 18,509 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
Id. at 18,510.

140

Id.

147

Id.

143
44

Id. (citing SEC v. Research Automation Corp., 585 F.2d 31, 32 (2d Cir. 1978)).
15 Av. Cas. at 18,512.
I"Id. at 18,511.
1I1 Id. at 18,512.
148
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Applying Article 20(1) of the Warsaw Convention the court
in McMurray v. Capitol InternationalAirways, 5 2 found that
a carrier is liable for damages to a passenger for delay or cancellation of a flight, despite conflicting provisions in the tariff
filed with and approved by the Civil Aeronautics Board, which
relieved the carrier of such liability.'5 3 In McMurray, the
plaintiff's flight from Brussels to New York was cancelled because of engine trouble one day prior to its scheduled departure. The court rejected the defendant's contention that all
measures had been taken to avoid the damages, finding that
the contingency of engine failure was certainly not to be considered "unforeseen" as part of an air carrier's business.'"
The court further found that the transportation the plaintiffs
found on their own should and could have been obtained by
the carrier as alternate transportation' 55 and that the carrier
could not simply rely on the unavailability of any of its other
aircraft.' 56
The question of whether the failure of the carrier to properly issue a baggage check conforming to the convention's requirements relieves the passenger of the necessity of filing a
written complaint of loss within three days was answered in
the affirmative in a case of apparent first impression, Pirillav.
Eastern Airlines, Inc. 57 The plaintiff, alleging loss of baggage,
failed to make a written complaint to the carrier regarding the
damage to his luggage until nine days after it was discovered.' 58 Eastern raised the three day preemptive period as a
defense. Evaluating Eastern's invocation pursuant to Article
4(4) of the convention, which states that provisions of the act
which "exclude or limit" carrier liability shall not apply where
15 Av. Cas. 18,087 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1980).
11 Id. at 18,088.
112

154
155
166
157

Id.

Id.
Id.
15 Av. Cas. 18,070 (Super. Ct. D.C. 1980).

'" Id. at 18,070. Article 26 provides in pertinent part: "In case of damage, the
person entitled to delivery must complain to the carrier forthwith after the discovery
of the damage, and, at the latest, within three (3) days from the date of receipt in the
case of baggage and seven (7) days from the date of receipt in the case of goods. .
Warsaw Convention of 1929, supra note 141.
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the carrier fails to provide a baggage check with the required
information,' 9 the court held that the three day notice period
was a provision which "excluded or limited" the carrier's liability, and therefore was rendered inoperative by the failure to
deliver to the passenger a baggage claim containing the requisite information. 60
Failure of the carrier to properly deliver a ticket to the
plaintiff notifying him of the Warsaw liability limitations was
also involved in Manion v. Pan American World Airways,
Inc. 6' In Manion, a sixteen year old girl, part of a tour group
organized for relatives of certain Aramco officers and employees in Saudi Arabia, was severely injured by a terrorist bomb
blast in the Rome International Airport while she awaited a
connecting flight to Beirut, Lebanon. In dealing with the invocation by the carrier of the $75,000 limitation of liability provided by the Warsaw Convention, as modified by the Montreal Agreement,' 6 2 the court dealt with the issue of burden of
proof as applied to delivery or non-delivery of a satisfactory
ticket. With completely contradictory evidence present in the
record, the court found that a ticket holder who seeks to avoid
the application of the Warsaw limitation of liability does not
have the burden of proving non-delivery of the ticket. 6 ' Instead, the court placed such a burden on the defendant carrier
who sought to invoke the $75,000 limitation of liability.'" In
doing so, the court relied upon the "well settled" jurisprudence that a party pleading an affirmative defense has the
burden of proving it. 65 Accordingly, the court held that the
carrier asserting limitation of liability has the duty of proving
the applicablity of the convention's limitation of liability, including the physical delivery of a properly worded ticket.'
Therefore, since no evidence was adduced at trial establishing
"'

See note 142 supra.
15 Av. Cas. at 18,072. See note 158 supra.

105 Misc. 2d 927, 430 N.Y.S.2d 486 (Sup. Ct. 1980).
49 U.S.C. § 1502 (1976).
16 430 N.Y.S.2d at 494.
164 Id.
165Id. at 493.
1 0 Id.
at 495.
''

"'
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that either the plaintiff or her tour escort had received a properly constituted ticket prior to the time she boarded the flight
in New York, the carrier was held not to be entitled to the
limitation of liability and was found liable for all damages
67
sustained by the plaintiff.1

VI.

FEDERAL TORT CLAIMS ACT -

U.S. GOVERNMENT

LIABILITY

Litigation involving liability of the United States for faulty

aeronautical charts has continued since the publication of last
year's report on case law developments. The plaintiffs prevailed against the United States in wrongful death actions
under the Federal Tort Claims Act for acts and omissions of
the FAA and FCC in Reminga v. United States,'18 a Sixth
Circuit opinion. The three decedents in Reminga were returning from a hunting trip in Wisconsin when their plane
crashed about 17 miles from the airport. Although the
weather was marginal, conditions were above minimum standards for takeoff.1 19 The pilot was flying VFR in and out of
the clouds, rain and snow just before the crash, which occurred when the plane hit a guy wire some 405 feet above the
ground. Although the 1,720 foot tower to which the wire was
attached was painted and illuminated in accordance with 47
C.F.R. Part 17, there were no lights or other markings on the
guy wires. 170 The Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision that the Government was negligent in publishing the
Green Bay Sectional Map with the location of the TV tower
shown inaccurately on the chart.1 7 1 Citing 49 U.S.C. section
1348(b) which authorizes but does not require the publication
of such charts,1 7 2 the court held that when the FAA arranges

for the publication of aeronautical navigation charts and engenders reliance on them, it is required to use due care to see
167

Id.

166

631 F.2d 449 (6th Cir. 1980).

'e
170
'
172

Id. at 451.
Id.
Id. at 452.
49 U.S.C. § 1348 (1976). See Indian Towing v. United States, 350 U.S. 61, 69

(1955).
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that they accurately depict what they purport to show, and
that the failure to show the accurate location of the tower ren173
dered the United States liable.
At the Fourteenth Annual Air Law Symposium, the case
law development report cited Baird v. United States,7 4 a
Kansas state court decision dealing with a publisher's liability
for aeronautical charts. In Baird, the district court granted
the Government's motion to dismiss, holding that the development and formulation of specifications for aeronautical
charts was within the "discretionary function" exception to
the Federal Tort Claims Act. 17" The Baird case was distinguished, however, in Allnutt v. United States,7 6 which involved a pilot, killed when his aircraft struck a power transmission line while flying at an altitude of 100 feet at
approximately 100 miles per hour over the Osage River. The
plaintiffs contended that the United States, acting through
the Commerce Department and its subagency, the National
Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, Aeronautical Chart
Division (ACD), 7 7 was negligent in failing to depict a power
transmission line on a particular chart. The pilot relied to his
detriment on the inaccurate chart, which chart stated on its
face that it was published in accordance with the Inter1 78
Agency Air Cartographic Committee (IACC) specifications.
The Allnutt court noted that in Baird,' 9 the plaintiff's complaint was that the Government, through the IACC, failed to
develop sufficiently comprehensive policies for inclusion of
...631 F.2d at 452. The district court had also premised liability on two other
grounds which the Sixth Circuit rejected. First, the court held that the FAA was not
negligent in issuing a "no hazard determination" when the construction of the TV
tower was proposed. Second, neither the FAA nor the FCC was negligent for failing to
require additional lighting or marking. The FAA was performing a discretionary function in making the "no hazard determination," and the FAA's failure to mark the guy
wires could not be the basis of an action against the United States for damages. Id. at
458 (citing 49 U.S.C. § 1348(a) (1976); and 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a) (1976)).
.. 15 Av. Cas. 17,476 (D. Kan. 1979).
178 Id. at 17,480.
176 498 F. Supp. 832 (W.D. Mo. 1980).
177 Id. at 835.
176 Id. at 837.
179 15 Av. Cas. 17,476 (D. Kan. 1979).
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visual flight information.180 In Allnutt, the court distinguished
Baird, noting that the plaintiffs were not challenging the sufficiency of the IACC specifications, but rather that the personnel within the ACD failed to properly adhere to the established IACC specifications in the preparation of the chart. '

The Allnutt court held:
As such, this court finds that the discretionary function exception does not apply to the mechanical preparationof aeronautical charts when such preparation fails to conform to specific
IACC standards or specifications. At such a basic level there is
no discretionary behavior in following the established IACC
rules for inclusion of power lines on sectional aeronautical
charts."8 2

As to negligence, however, the Allnutt court held that the
United States was not liable when the power transmission line

was below 200 feet, and had no landmark value; therefore, the
transmission line was not required by the IACC rules to be
1 s8
included on the chart.

The United States was found liable due to air traffic controller negligence in Universal Aviation Underwriters v.
United States.18 4 In that case a mid-air collision occurred in
clear weather within the Denver Terminal control area at a

time when visibility extended up to forty miles. The district
court found that the air traffic controllers failed to utilize in180 Id. at 17,477.

18, 498 F. Supp. at 838.
1S2Id. (citing Reminga v. United States, 488 F. Supp. 445 (W.D. Mich. 1978)).
,8 Id. at 841. Arguendo, the court held that the pilot's conduct in flying his airplane at an altitude of 100 feet and a speed over 100 miles per hour over a winding
river constituted contributory negligence. Id. at 843. See also Foss v. United States,
623 F.2d 104 (9th Cir. 1980) (where the Ninth Circuit affirmed judgment in favor of
the plaintiff in a wrongful death action under the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C.
§ 2671 (1976) (FTCA), holding that the FAA was negligent in publishing a traffic
pattern calling for an 800 foot downwind approach to the airport at Fullerton, California, where there was an 819 foot radio tower less than two miles away); Knight v.
United States, 498 F. Supp. 316 (E.D. Mich. 1980) (where a federal district court in
Michigan found no negligence on the part of the United States under the FTCA for
failing to portray a radio tower on an aeronautical chart when the chart was published prior to a time when information concerning the construction of the tower was
available).
1" 496 F. Supp. 639 (D. Colo. 1980).

30

JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE

[47

formation available from a Britescope to supplement visual
observation out of the window of the control tower.18 As the
court itself noted, there were no issues of law decided in Universal Aviation Underwriters which were either complex or
difficult, but attorneys who are concerned with air traffic control should read this case for an outline of factual circumstances viewed in the context of the requirements of the FAA
Air Traffic Procedures Manual.1 86
VII.

AIRPORT AND AIRLINE OPERATIONS AND REGULATIONS

In petitions for review of orders of the Civil Aeronautics
Board (CAB), the Tenth Circuit in Frontier Airlines, Inc. v.
CAB," 7 held that CAB statutory power to order involuntary
continuance of service to cities by Frontier until a suitable replacement carrier could be found also included the power to
order Frontier to provide temporary backup service for the replacement carrier in order to ensure the replacement carrier
to be capable of providing essential services to the affected
cities on a continuing basis. 188
In Sima Products Corp. v. McLucas,"e the plaintiff corporation and its president brought an action in the United
States, Northern District of Illinois, 90 challenging an amendment to a regulation promulgated by the FAA concerning the
use of X-ray devices for inspection of carry-on baggage at airport security points.' 9' The plaintiffs argued that the required
signs were too misleading and that the rule allowing airports
to permit signs to be posted was arbitrary, capricious and unreasonable.19 2 The Seventh Circuit held that the courts of ap185 Id. at 647. A Britescope is a television reproduction of the radarscope located in

the radar room.
'8 Id. at 650. See Gill v. United States, 429 F.2d 1072 (5th Cir. 1970); Hartz v.
United States, 387 F.2d 870 (5th Cir. 1968).
.87 621 F.2d 369 (10th Cir. 1980).
...Id. at 372 (citing 49 U.S.C. § 1389(a)(6) (Supp. II 1978)).
189 612 F.2d 309 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 908 (1980).
'90 460 F. Supp. 128 (N.D. Ill. 1978).
9- 14 C.F.R. § 121.538a(e) (1978), promulgated by the FAA under certain sections
of the Federal Aviation Administration Act, 49 U.S.C. §§ 1356-1357 (Supp. II 1978),
and 14 C.F.R. §§ 121.1(a), 121.538 (1978).
'9' Id. at 312.
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peals have exclusive jurisdiction to review a rule promulgated
by the FAA, pursuant to notice-and-comment rulemaking.
The court further held that the district court's decision to dismiss because of a lack of subject matter jurisdiction was correct; the sixty day limit for filing a petition for review of an
agency in a court of appeals had long passed for the
plaintiffs. 193
The District of Columbia Court of Appeals has ruled that,
under the Federal Aviation Act of 1958,'" a rule of the FAA
promulgated after informal notice-and-comment is an "order"
within the exclusive review jurisdiction of the courts of appeals. 9 ' In another District of Columbia appellate case,
National Small Shipments Traffic Conference, Inc. v. CAB 9'
the petitioners challenged provisions of CAB regulations governing domestic air cargo transportation. 9 7 The challenged

rule exempted domestic air cargo carriers from: (1) the duty
to file tarriffs showing the carrier's rates, rules and practices
for cargo transportation; 198 (2) the duty to provide air transportation service upon reasonable request;' 9 and (3) the statutory provisions relating to the filing of inter-carrier agreements affecting domestic air transportation.2 00 In National
Small Shipments Chief Judge J. Skelly Wright reviewed the
history of the Federal Aviation Act and the background of
Congress' fundamental changes in the approach to the air
transportation industry.20 In a lengthy opinion, the court
held that the CAB had ample authority to issue the regulations which were challenged, and that its decision was not ar"93

Id. at 314-15.

"

5 U.S.C. § 551(6) (1976). See generally 49 U.S.C. § 1486(a) (1976) (concerning

jurisdiction of reviews of CAB orders).
"' See Deutsche Lufthansa Aktiengesellschaft v. CAB, 479 F.2d 912, 915-16 (D.C.
Cir. 1973). See generally Currie and Goodman, Judicial Review of Federal Administrative Action: Quest for the Optimum Forum, 75 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (1975); Verkuil,
Judicial Review of Informal Rulemaking, 60 VA. L. REV. 185 (1974).
618 F.2d 819 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
'9
Id. at 821.
198 49 U.S.C. § 1373(a) (1976).
"9 49 U.S.C. § 1374(a)(1) (1976).
:00 49 U.S.C. §§ 1382, 1384 (Supp. II 1978).
11 618 F.2d at 822-26.
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bitrary or capricious.20 2
2 03
Delta Airlines in Delta Airlines, Inc. v. United States
brought an action in the district court for the Northern District of Georgia to enjoin the FAA and the Federal Air Surgeon from certain practices, and the Airline Pilots Association, International, was permitted to intervene. Delta filed a
motion for summary judgment, which was granted by the
court, enjoining the FAA, the Administrator and the Federal
Air Surgeon from issuing pilots' medical certificates to pilots
possessing any of the Federal Aviation Act's absolutely disqualifying medical conditions, without a proper finding that
an exemption was in the public's interest.2 " The Federal Air
Surgeon was also enjoined from placing on airmen any limitations that described the flight functions that such airmen
might perform.20 5
In Branning v. United States, 0 " the plaintiff, who owned
island property adjacent to a marine air training facility, sued
the United States for the taking of his property without just
compensation. Several days each month, heavy training operations took place which involved Flying F-4 aircraft at altitudes from 600 to 1,000 feet in a race track pattern over the
plaintiff's property.20 The plaintiff, through discovery, obtained and brought before the court an Air Installation Compatibility Use Zone Study (AICUZ) that had been performed
for the Marine Corps, which denoted the plaintiff's property
as rendered "clearly unacceptable for residential use or development."',0 8 Relying on the AICUZ as the primary evidentiary
basis for its decision, the court found that the plaintiff's use of
his property had been substantially impaired and that comSos

Id. at 827-28, 831-32.

o3 490 F. Supp. 907 (N.D. Ga. 1980). See also County of Kern v. CAB, 633 F.2d

856 (9th Cir. 1980) (CAB's interpretation of "essential air transportation" was reason-

able and in compliance with underlying policies of the Airline Deregulation Act of
1978, Pub. L. No. 95-504, 92 Stat. 1705 (1978)).
:04

490 F. Supp. at 917.

5 Id. at 918-19.

:06 15 Av. Cas. 18,123 (Ct. Cl. 1980).
07Id. at 18,124.
"0S Id.
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pensation would, therefore, be due from the United States. 0 9
In so holding, the court rejected the United States' defense
that the airspace utilized in its training operations was declared to be navigable airspace and subject to the regulation
of the United States.21
In order to meet federal regulations pertaining to the funding of airport improvements, a runway clear zone was established by imposing height restrictions on several parcels adjacent to the airport owned by the plaintiffs in the case S. J. &
J. Service Station, Inc. v. State' 1 1 All of the parcels were
zoned for light industry, a category which excluded residential
use. In an action brought by the plaintiff landowners seeking
damages for the appropriation of air space due to the establishment of the clear zone, the court denied the claims, finding
that there had been no showing of a diminution of market
value considering the industrial uses of the properties."2 '

VIII.

AVIATION INSURANCE

Following the trend noted in the 1980 case law review, the
courts are showing a growing willingness to enforce coverage
limitations and exclusions contained in aviation insurance policies. For example, in Ranger Insurance Co. v. Air-Speed
Co., 21 ' the court applied and interpreted the standard policy
provision allowing for coverage of a substitute aircraft while
the named aircraft is temporarily out of service. In that case
the insured utilized a second aircraft in its commuter service
operations and this non-named aircraft crashed while engaged
in such use. The policy-named aircraft was not flying at the
time of the crash. The court, noting the prior operation by the
209 Id. at 18,132. The court, noting that its latest decision, Lacey v. United States,
595 F.2d 614 (Ct. Cl. 1979), could not be construed as a denial that a "taking" could
occur where the activities complained of consisted of flying at altitudes above 500
feet. The court found that the noise aspect of such flights, by itself, might form a
sufficient basis for the finding of a taking and the awarding of damages caused
thereby. Id. at 18,131-32.
"10 Id. at 18,129.
"1 15 Av. Cas. 18,039 (N.Y. App. Div. 1980).
...Id. at 18,040.
213 401 N.E.2d 872 (Mass. 1980).
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insured of two aircraft and considering the insured's policy to
use only one aircraft when business was light, found that the
airplane involved in the crash was not an aircraft "temporarily used as a substitute," within the meaning of the policy.2 1'
For the same reasons, the destroyed aircraft was also found
not to be an "equipped replacement" for the named
aircraft.2
The "temporary use of substitute aircraft" policy provision
was also an issue in Roberts v. Gonzales,2 1 albeit with opposite results. In Roberts, the principal carrier, under an informal arrangement, transferred passengers to a substitute air
taxi service, and after that aircraft crashed, the coverage question arose. 1 In interpreting this provision, the court had no
difficulty with most of the policy prerequisites to coverage.
The first requirement of the clause, that the named aircraft be
"withdrawn from normal use" at the time of the occurrence
giving rise to the claim, was perfunctorily answered in the affirmative.21 8 The principal air carrier contended that the
plaintiffs did not prove that the aircraft remained out of service when the crash occurred.'" On this point, the court held
that it was proper to interpret the clause so that the insured
had a reasonable period of time after repairs were completed
to put the plane back into service, stating that: "Clause IV [of
the insurance policy] provides no such express time limitation
and, therefore, the court will imply that a reasonable time
"I Id. at 875.
"l

Id.

495 F. Supp. 1310 (D.V.I. 1980).

Id. at 1313. Clause IV of Lloyd's of London's insurance policy No. 20594
provided:
217

Temporary Use of Substitute Aircraft

While an aircraft owned by the named insured is withdrawn from normal use because of its breakdown, repair, servicing, loss or destruction,
such insurance as is afforded by this policy with respect to such aircraft applies also with respect to another aircraft of similar type,
horsepower, and seating capacity, not so owned while temporarily used
as the substitute for such aircraft. This Insuring Agreement does not
cover as an insured the owner of the substitute aircraft nor any agent
or employee of such owner.
Id. at 1318.
:1s Id. at 1310.
1' Id.
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within which Caribbean could return its aircraft to service and
retain coverage would be a minimum of 24 hours."2 0°
The most "strenuous analysis" of the six policy prerequisites was applied to the question of whether the substitute
aircraft was "temporarily used as the substitute. 2 2 ' After reviewing the facts and citing cases involving the same question
as to automobiles, the court held that the substituted aircraft
was "temporarily used as a substitute" for the principal flight
and noted that its "somewhat expansive interpretation of the
term 'used' ",222 is consistent with the general view of courts
analyzing the term in insurance contracts, and therefore,
Lloyds' policy extended coverage to the substituted flight.2 8
In construing whether or not an "all risks" hull policy covered expenses incurred in bringing the covered aircraft's engines to zero time in order to satisfy air worthiness certification requirements, the court in Busch v. Ranger Insurance
Co.,224 found in the affirmative. In this case, the subject aircraft had struck both of its propellers on the runway during a
hard landing. In order to bring the engines up to air worthiness condition, disassembly and inspection were required. The
court found that such expenses were covered and must be
paid under the "all risks" insurance coverage provision. 225 The
insured, it found, was entitled to have his aircraft restored to
an airworthy condition in order to make whole the damage
sustained in the covered occurrence. 2
Relying on the "operated by any pilot other than as specified in the declaration" exclusion, the district court in Master
Feeders II, Inc. v. United States Fire Insurance Co.,227 rendered summary judgment in favor of the insurer of a Cessna
182 and against its owner, Master Feeders. The aircraft struck
power lines during its approach while the "unqualified" pilot
2" Id. at 1319.

SId.
Id. at 1321.

22

Hz Id.
124 46
2

217

Or. App. 17, 610 P.2d 304 (1980).

Id. at 307.

Id.
15 Av. Cas. 18,420 (D. Kan. 1980).
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was in command of the aircraft. A "qualified" pilot was present in the right-hand co-pilot's seat and upon noting the
power lines looming ahead, he seized the right-hand controls
and pulled back on the yoke, as did the non-qualified pilot.
Unfortunately, the aircraft was unable to clear the obstruction
and crashed. The court found that the exclusion of coverage
while the aircraft was operated by a non-qualified pilot operated to negate liability on behalf of the insurer for injuries
suffered by the passenger occupying the co-pilot's seat.22 8
Finding that the unqualified pilot was operating the airplane
at the time of the crash, the court noted that even had this
not been the case, when a non-qualified pilot places the aircraft in such a position as to increase the insurer's risk of loss,
the mere gaining of control by a qualified pilot does not reinstate the coverage, as long as the increased risk of loss created
by the non-qualified pilot continues to exist.2 2 9
The efficacy of the standard insurance clause requiring each
insured pilot to maintain a current medical certificate was upheld by the court in Smith v. Coker Aviation Insurance.3 0 In
rendering its summary judgment, the court found in favor of
the insurer and against claims made under the policy for damages arising out of the crash of the insured aircraft while it
was operated by the plaintiff, a pilot whose medical certificate
had expired over five months previous to the accident.23 1 The
plaintiff, however, renewed his certificate two weeks after the
accident occurred, and argued that the exclusion was therefore inapplicable.2 2 The court based its decision on the plain
language of the policy, refusing to read the exclusion so as to
give any retroactive effect to the regaining of a current medical certificate.2 "
Consistent with other reported cases which literally apply
policy requirements and exclusions, the Texas Supreme Court
:28

Id. at 18,424-25.

"
20

Id. at 18,425.
15 Av. Cas. 18,217 (W.D. Okla. 1980).

"'
:13

Id.

at 18,218-19.

Id. at 18,218.

" Id. at 18,219.
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in Stewart v. Vanguard Insurance Co.su affirmed the Court
of Civil Appeals' take nothing judgment in a personal injury
action brought by the pilot of the insured aircraft who had
not complied with the ten hour type experience requirement
contained in the pilot description clause of the policy."
Plaintiff Stewart, upon making a final approach at a local airstrip, came in too high, bounced violently several times upon
contact with the runway and then froze at the controls. A passenger, also a pilot, took control of the aircraft and attempted
a belated missed approach, but could not gain enough altitude
and struck a pine tree at the end of the runway. In construing
the term "logged" as used in the policy's ten hour type currency requirement, the court found that the policy required a
pilot to have operated a Cessna 180 airplane "as the pilot in
command" for ten hours preceding the occurrence.26 Accepting the jury's finding that the passenger was the pilot in
command of the aircraft at the time of the crash, the court
found that this pilot had "logged" only six hours in the aircraft prior to the time he left on the subject flight.3 7 The
plaintiff's testimony that the passenger had acted as an instructor in flying the Cessna during the fateful trip, and had
thereby met the ten hour requirement, was not sufficient evidence to show compliance with the insurance policy. The
court, therefore, affirmed the Court of Civil Appeals finding
for the insurer.3
In Middlesex Mutual Insurance Co. v. Bright,2 ° the court
upheld the insurer's defense against claims made by its insured for recovery of damages to power lines occasioned by
the crash of the subject aircraft shortly after a nighttime takeoff. Investigation showed that the aircraft was loaded with
over 541 kilos of marijuana at the time of the crash. Finding
non-coverage, the court affirmed the decision of the Superior
Court which dismissed the claims of the power company for
:9

603 S.W.2d 761 (Tex. 1980).

"

Id. at 763.

:31
37
:38
39

Id. at 762.
Id. at 763.
Id.
106 Cal. App. 3d 282, 165 Cal. Rptr. 45 (1980).
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the damages to its transmission lines2 40 In doing so, the court
overruled the company's argument that such a policy exclusion was unenforceable under the provision of the California
Insurance Code which prohibits exclusion of coverage for operation of the insured vehicle "in violation of federal or civil
air regulations, or any state law or local ordinance."'
Rejecting the plaintiff's contention that the "illegal purpose" exclusion was prohibited by this California statute, the
court found that a clear distinction exists between the "operated for an illegal purpose" exclusion and the restricting language of the California Insurance Code.24 The latter, it found,
referred to exclusions based upon violation of federal air operational regulations. This exclusion, the court reasoned, is separate and apart from exclusions establishing a limitation of
the use of an aircraft for illegal purposes. 24 3 The court also
rejected the plaintiff's argument that the insurer must show a
causal connection between the unlawful use and the air
crash.2 " Noting that some ambiguity existed in the jurisprudence, the court followed the lead of the Idaho district court
in Roberts v. Underwriters at Lloyds of London24 ' and refused to place such a burden on the insurer denying
coverage.246
Demonstrative of the maxim that the injured party has no
greater right against the wrongdoer's insurer than the insured
would have, the trial division of the New York Supreme Court
in Steinbach v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co.,2 47 found that
the plaintiff, who had obtained a judgment against the insured of the defendant, Aetna Casualty, was not entitled to
recover against the insurance company. The court found that
the insured's failure to notify the company of the accident
giving rise to the litigation served to vitiate coverage by the
240

Id. at 293, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 50.
CODE § 11584 (West 1980).
106 Cal. App. 3d at 288, 165 Cal Rptr. at 48.

a" CAL. INS.
242

240

Id.

Id. at 289, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 49.
195 F. Supp. 168, 171 (S.D. Idaho 1961).
: 106 Cal. App. 3d at 290-91, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 49-50.
76 15 Av. Cas. 18,096 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. 1980).
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policy's own terms.2"
IX.

A.

JURISDICTIONAL AND PROCEDURAL MATTERS

Jurisdiction

Jayne v. Royal JordanianAirlines Corp.,4 9 is an example
of the extremely broad construction of long arm jurisdiction
statutes vis-a-vis foreign defendants. Here the court held that
it had jurisdiction to adjudicate claims made by representatives of American citizens killed in the 1977 crash of an Arab
Wings aircraft in Amman, Jordan. Two actions, one filed in
Illinois and the other in New York, were consolidated for pretrial proceedings by the Judicial Panel on Multi-District Litigation. The owner and the operator of the Lear jet aircraft,
Arab Wings, had no offices or employees located in the United
States. The court conceded that such tenuous contacts as borrowing money from New York banks or securing the services
from a New York public relations firm were not sufficient to
submit the corporation to the jurisdiction of the New York
court.2 50 However, the court zeroed in on the close relationship between Arab Wings and Royal Jordanian Airlines,
which on occasion had acted as a booking agent for the charter carrier.2 5 1 Royal Jordanian's single agent in New York, in
the year preceding the disaster, booked approximately $16,000
of business for Arab Wings and earned a 5% commission totalling $800.25
Applying the New York jurisdictional test applicable to
agents, the court found that Royal Jordanian Airlines was a
de facto agent of Arab Wings and that it did "all the business
which the other corporation could do were it here by its own
officials. 2 58 The court found that under New York law, the
focus must be on the question of whether the in-state services
Id. at 18,098.
I'
502 F. Supp. 848 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).

21O Id.
"'
"'

at 856.
Id. at 858.
Id. at 855.

13 Id. at 856. See Frummer v. Hilton Hotel Int'l, Inc., 19 N.Y.2d 533, 537, 227
N.E.2d 851, 854, 281 N.Y.S.2d 41, 44, cert. denied, 389 U.S. 923 (1967).
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company has the authority to make final reservations in the
name of the out-of-state defendant.2" The court distinguished
cases involving the design of products,8 5 noting that defendant Arab Wings had only sold a service, much of which was'
provided by its agent.2"Regarding the Illinois action, the
court found that jurisdiction was assertable consonant with
International Shoe "minimum contacts.' 57 Due process requirements were met since Royal Jordanian Airlines was present in Illinois and actually conducted business there. Because
the court found that Arab Wings was a "department" of the
parent, Royal Jordanian Airlines, jurisdiction attached and
minimum contacts thereby existed in Illinois sufficient to sustain the imposition of in personam jurisdiction over the
carrier.25
In Montgomery v. American Airlines, Inc.,'" the court dismissed the plaintiff's class action for failure to state a claim
upon which relief could be granted. The action purported to
represent all sky caps who were not afforded the reduced fare
or cost-free interstate transportation by American Airlines,
Inc., that was afforded its employees, directors and certain affiliates' employees, pursuant to a filed tariff." 0 While noting
that section 403(b)(1) of the Federal Aviation Act,"1 permits
free or reduced fair rates only for overseas or foreign air transportation, the court nevertheless dismissed the plaintiff's action in favor of a prior adjudication by the Civil Aeronautics
Board. The court found that the CAB has "primary jurisdiction" over claims which assert that a filed tariff is either unreasonable in amount or unduly discriminatory in effect. 6 2
The court further ruled, however, that when a claim is made
that a carrier has violated its own filed tariff or established
," 502 F. Supp. at 858.
,55 See, e.g., Delagi v. Volkswagenwerk AG, 29 N.Y.2d 426, 278 N.E.2d 895, 328
N.Y.S.2d 653 (1972).
'
502 F. Supp. at 859-60.
,, International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945).
' ' 502 F. Supp. at 861.
637 F.2d 607 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 1368 (1981).
I8
Id.
''
49 U.S.C. § 1373(b)(1) (1976).
'
637 F.2d at 608.
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transportation custom, then such claim falls within the jurisdiction of the federal courts and may be adjudicated there.2 63
In doing so, the court followed the lead of the Second Circuit
264
in Danna v. Air France.

Air carriers should take note and be warned by the Eighth
Circuit's decision in International Trade Arrangers, Inc. v.
Western Airlines, Inc.211 There, the plaintiff, a Minnesota or-

ganizer of travel group charters, brought a suit against Western Airlines for alleged anti-trust violations. The court found
that Western had engaged in a campaign to prevent travel
group charters from becoming a competitive threat to its regularly scheduled air service. The campaign included false,
misleading and deceptive advertising directed at consumers
and travel agents. 266 The court affirmed the district court's restraint of trade trebled damages award of $361,000, along with
substantial costs, and modified attorney's fees in the sum of
$118,000 for lead counsel and $43,000 for local counsel. 267 The
court also reviewed the contingency fee agreement between
the plaintiff and lead counsel, and concluded that the outer
bounds of reasonableness required that such fee be limited to
45% of the trebled damage award.26
Eagerness often results in prematurity, as the Pilots Rights
Association discovered in Pilots Rights Ass'n, Inc. v. FAA,'

9

a

case in which the Association brought an action against the
FAA to enjoin a study reexamining the continued medical and
scientific rationality of the "Age 60 Rule." The FAA's motion
to dismiss was granted by Judge Gesell on the grounds both
that the Association did not have standing to challenge the
FAA's award of a contract to conduct the study,270 and that

under Article III, Section 1 of the Constitution the claim was
Id. at 610.
26- 463 F.2d 407 (2d Cir. 1972).
265 623 F.2d 1255 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 787 (1980).
US

26" Id. at 1266.
267 Id. at 1278.
268 Id.

269 86 F.R.D. 174 (D.D.C. 1980).
170 Id. at 177.
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not ripe for judicial resolution.2 7 1
The Greater Tampa Chamber of Commerce in its suit
against the Secretary of Transportation2 72 challenged the validity of the "Bermuda II" agreement between the United
States and the United Kingdom, which regulates air travel between the two nations. 2 7 The District of Columbia Court of
Appeals held that the Chamber of Commerce did not have
standing to maintain the action since it failed to show that
the court could redress the injury which it averred to have
suffered.2 7 4 The court noted that even if the Chamber prevailed, the independent obstacles of possible Senate approval
of Bermuda II and the United Kingdom's control over its own
air space would remain and, while these might not be "absolute" obstacles, the complaint contained nothing which would
lead the court to expect that they would be overcome.
B.

Choice of Law

The Chicago air disaster of May 25, 1979, is providing several noteworthy decisions. For example, the Seventh Circuit
has issued an interesting choice-of-law decision in In re Air
Crash Disaster, Near Chicago, Illinois, on May 25, 1979.276
Choice of law considerations were successfully invoked by the
defendants to avoid the imposition of punitive damages. The
court observed that the primary alternative forums could be:
(1) the place of a disaster; (2) the place of the manufacture of
the aircraft; (3) the place of the primary business of the airline; or (4) the primary place of business of the manufacturer.2 7 Only the latter forum allowed punitive damages, and
the court found, based on the Restatement (Second) Conflict
of Laws' determinants, that the law of the place of injury, IlliId.
171 Greater Tampa Chamber of Commerce v. Goldschmidt, 627 F.2d 258 (D.C. Cir.
1980).
273 Id.
97' Id. at 265.
978 Id. at 263.
7' 644 F.2d 594 (7th Cir. 1981).
177 Id. at 604.
271
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nois, would be applicable.2 8
One hundred and eighteen wrongful death actions arising
out of the crash of American DC-10 Flight 191 were consolidated by transfer by the Judicial Panel on Multi-District Litigation to the Northern District of Illinois.279 Lawsuits against
American Airlines and McDonnell Douglas Corporation had
been filed in Illinois, California, New York, Michigan, Hawaii
and Puerto Rico by residents of eleven states, Puerto Rico
and three foreign countries. It was the decision of the district
court that, under Illinois' "most significant relationship" test,
the law of the principal place of business of each of the defendants should prevail with regard to the issue of punitive damages. 280 Therefore, that court found that American Airlines,
with its principal place of business in New York, escaped punitive damages2 81 while McDonnell Douglas, with its principal
place of business in Missouri, was subject to such claims.28
Reversing the lower court's denial of McDonnell Douglas' motion to strike punitive damages claims, the Seventh Circuit
also held that MDC was not subject to punitive damages.2 8
The court reviewed the substantive law of each of the seven
interested states, noting that Illinois, California, New York
and Hawaii reject punitive damage awards in wrongful death
actions, while Oklahoma, Texas and Missouri (through a concept of "aggravating circumstances") allow them.8 4 After considering the individual state choice of law rules, 85 the court
determined which of the states having some relationship to
the parties of the crash had the "most significant interest in
the application of its own substantive law to the merits of the
punitive damage issue."'8 6 The court rejected an approach

280

Id. at 611.
Id. at 604 n.1.
Id. at 605.

281

Id.

282

Id.

s
279

,a Id. at 616.
284 Id. at 605-07.
285 See Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487 (1941), where the Supreme Court held that in diversity cases, federal courts must decide conflict of laws
questions by following the conflict of laws rules of the states in which they sit.
281 644 F.2d at 610.
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which would have considered the various states' interests "in
general," but instead, narrowed the issue to state's interest in
the application of punitive damages.287 Therefore, the depecage28 8 splitting of choice of law, issue by issue, was utilized by
the court to make its analysis more "precise. ' 89
Ironically, after methodically plodding through the Restatement (Second) of Conflicts' "most significant relationship"
test29 adopted by Illinois, the court found that the situs of
the accident controlled and that Illinois law should apply to
those actions filed in Illinois.2 9 The court arrived at this result by finding that of the three interested states (Illinois,
Missouri and California) Missouri's and California's interests
in, respectively, allowing and disallowing punitive damages,
were evenly balanced.29 2 Therefore, there was no showing that
another state had "a more significant relationship" than that
of the place of injury, as specified in the Restatement (Second) presumption contained in Section 175.29 8 Deeming such
analysis a "principled means" which "creates certainty,"2 9
the court put air carriers on notice that, where a true conflict
exists between states having equal interests regarding the issue of punitive damages, the place of injury will control. With
regard to American Airlines, the court likewise found that
287 Id. at 611.
88 The court defined "depecage" as the "process of applying rules of different

states on the basis of the precise issue involved." 644 F.2d at 611. See Reese, Depecage: A Common Phenomenon in Choice of Law, 73 COLUM. L. REV. 58 (1973).
, 644 F.2d at 611.
100 Sections 175 and 178 of the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws provides
as follows:
§ 175. Right of Action for Death
In an action for wrongful death, the local law of the state where the
injury occurred determines the rights and liabilities of the parties unless, with respect to the particular issue, some other state has a more
significant relationship . . . to the occurrence and the parties, in which
event the local law of the other state will be applied.
§ 178. Damages
The law selected by application of the rule of § 175 determines the
measure of damages in an action for wrongful death.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 175, 178 (1971).
:91 644 F.2d at 616.
292 Id.
193

RESTATEMENT (SECOND)

2"4

644 F.2d at 616.

OF CONFLICT OF LAWS §

175 (1971). See note 290 supra.
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under Illinois law, the place of alleged negligent conduct
(Oklahoma), and the state of the principal place of business
(New York), had equally strong interests which could not,
therefore, displace the law of the situs of the accident as the
one to be applied.295
Regarding the suits filed in California, the court applied the
California "comparative impairment" conflicts scheme 2" and
found that the California interest in denying punitive damages was equivalent in strength to Missouri's interest in imposing them.2 97 Therefore, the court reasoned that Illinois law
should be applied because, as the situs of the accident, its
twofold interest underlying denial of punitive damages would
be the most impaired if Illinois law were not applied.2 9 This
analysis was found true both for McDonnell Douglas, which
would not be liable for punitive damages under either California or Illinois law, and for American Airlines, since its New
York principal place of business refused to impose punitive
damages. New York's interest in protecting New York corporations from excessive financial liability overshadowed
Oklahoma's interest in punishing tortfeasors through punitive
damages.29 For the same reasons that Illinois law regarding
punitive damages was held to apply to McDonnell Douglas,
New York law was held to apply to American Airlines800
With regard to actions filed in New York, the same interestanalysis outlined by the court under Illinois law was utilized,
resulting in the application of Illinois law to these claim. 01
'

Id. at 621.

'"Id.
Id. at 625. The court noted that Illinois was "severely affected" by the crash,
I97
and it had a strong interest in protecting "airplace-related industries" from excessive
liability, as well as deterring negligence in Illinois. Id. at 625-26.
2" The two-pronged test of the California rule examines these factors: (1) the current status of the statute and the intensity of the interest with which it is held, and
(2) the comparative pertinence as "fit" between the purpose of the legislature and the
statute in the situation at hand. The controlling law is that of the state whose interest
would be the more impaired if its law were not applied. Bernhard v. Harrah's Club,
16 Cal. App. 3d 313, 546 P.2d 719, 128 Cal. Rptr. 215, cert. denied, 429 U.S, 859
(1976).
199
300
'

644 F.2d at 624-26.
Id. at 626-28.

Id. at 628-29.
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For much the same reason, and in consideration of the lex loci

delicti rule which is still influential in Michigan, 80 the same
result was reached for the claims filed in Michigan.3 0 3 As a
final matter, the court found that denying punitive damages
in wrongful death actions, while allowing them in other personal injury actions, did not offend the plaintiffs' due process
or equal protection rights." 4
In Masera v. Trans World Airlines, Inc.,80 an action arising
out of the September 8, 1974 crash of TWA Flight 841 into
the Ionian Sea, the Southern District of New York court felt
constrained to apply Italian law under the New York "center
of gravity" or "grouping of contacts" choice of law doctrine.
The case was brought by the survivors of two Italian stewardesses who were based in Rome, and employed there by TWA.
The court found that Italy "has the greatest concern with the
specific issue raised in this litigation." ' 01 The contacts noted
by the court included the fact that the plaintiffs were Italian

citizens living in Italy, the air crash occurred in waters off Italy, and a TWA occupational life insurance policy covering
the decedents was purchased and issued in Rome and paid in
Italian lire.3 07 The only New York contacts were found to be
that TWA's principal office was located in New York and that
$02 Id. at 629-30. The same conclusion was reached for the claims filed in Puerto
Rico, which not only applies the lex loci delicti doctrine but also does not recognize
punitive damages in tort actions. Id. at 630. With respect to the claims filed in Hawaii, the court held that Hawaii apparently does not allow punitive damages so that
under the "two modern choice-of-law theories, as well as the old rule of lex loci
delicti," punitive damages could not be awarded against either McDonnell Douglas or
American Airlines. Id. at 630.
808 Id.
804 Id.
at 610. The court found that such a classification is rationally related to a
legitimate state purpose, finding support in In Re Paris Air Crash, 622 F.2d 1315 (9th
Cir. 1980), that the legitimate state interest in avoiding excessive liability to defendants was valid and was determined by the state interest in punishing or deterring
misconduct. Id.
8ob 492 F. Supp. 950 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) See also Hawley v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 625
F.2d 991 (10th Cir. 1980), where the court held that the action brought in Kansas
must be dismissed, because under Kansas' borrowing statute, by application of the
statute of limitations of the locus delicti (California), that state's limitation period
for wrongful death of one year required affirmation of the lower court's dismissal.
806492
807Id.

F. Supp. at 953.
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the ultimate destination of Flight 841 was New York. 08
Weighing the contacts, the court found that application of
Italian law was mandated, and since Italian law made the insurance proceeds an exclusive remedy, the court dismissed the
plaintiff's complaint.30 9
In Reyno v. Piper Aircraft Co.,3 10 the plaintiffs filed a
wrongful death action in a California state court against,
among others, Piper, the Pennsylvania plane manufacturer,
and Hartzell Propeller, Inc., an Ohio propeller manufacturer,
for damages arising out of the crash of a Piper plane in Scotland. The case was removed to federal court and then transferred to the United States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania. The Third Circuit, as to the choice of
law issues, noted that the action against Piper was transferred
from California to Pennsylvania under section 1404(a) of the
United States Code, and held that the law of the transferring
forum (California choice of law rules) would, therefore, be applied to Piper"' under the Supreme Court case of Van Dusen
2 As to Hartzell,
v. Barrack.the propeller manufacturer, the
situation was more complex. The California district court
ruled that personal jurisdiction over Hartzell was lacking.
That court did not dismiss the case against Hartzell, but
quashed process and transferred it to Pennsylvania along with
Piper. The court held that any asserted conflict between
American strict liability and Scottish negligence law was a
false one. ' Scotland's interest in the encouragement of industry by protecting manufacturers and making it relatively
more difficult for consumers to recover, was perceived to be in
conflict with Pennsylvania's adherence to strict liability which
acted to shift some of the burdens of injury from consumers
:08 Id.
309

Id.

630 F.2d 149 (3d Cir. 1980), rev'd on other grounds, 50 U.S.L.W. 4055 (1981).
Id. at 164. 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (1976) provides: "For the convenience of parties
and witnesses, in the interest of justice, a district court may transfer any civil action
to any other district or division where it might have been brought."
310

311

2 376 U.S. 612 (1964).

'" 630 F.2d at 167.
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to producers.3 14 The court noted that-the application of Pennsylvania strict liability standards to its resident manufacturer
would serve that state's interest in the regulation of manufacturing, and that Scotland's interest in encouraging industry
within its borders would not be impaired by applying a
stricter standard of care to a foreign corporation.3 15 The court,
therefore, concluded that as between Pennsylvania and Scottish law, a California court would apply Pennsylvania's strict
liability analysis.3 16
The court also applied Pennsylvania law as to Hartzell,
holding the primary approach of the Pennsylvania Supreme
3 17
Court in choice of law to be governmental interest analysis.
The Third Circuit "predicted" that, under California law, the
Pennsylvania court would apply American strict liability and
unlimited recovery for wrongful death, rather than the negligence and damage limitations law of Scotland.3 1 8 The court
held that the district court erred in its conclusion that Scottish law would govern a substantial part of the case or that
this consideration should be a determinative factor in dismissing the case under forum non conveniens.3 1 9 There will
probably be a further report on the development of this case
in next year's report.
The decision in Icelandic Airlines, Inc. v. Canadair,Ltd.,3 20
will be mentioned only briefly since, ultimately, the court applied the law of Quebec in a suit brought by an aircraft buyer
against the aircraft's manufacturer and the New York manufacturer of an allegedly defective hydraulic selector valve. The
aircraft manufacturer, Canadair, had previously been dismissed by the court. The valve manufacturer, whom plaintiff
sought to hold liable on theories of negligence, strict liability
and breach of warranty, moved for summary judgment. The
reasoning of the court vacillated on the choice of law question
Id.
s Id. at 168.

:14

316

Id.

Id. at 170.
'8 Id. at 170-71.
:19 Id. at 171.
1* 104 Misc. 2d 239, 428 N.Y.S.2d 393 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. 1980).
:17
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from New York to Quebec. The defendant placed an apparently uncontested affidavit in evidence which indicated that
Quebec did not recognize an action based upon strict products
liability.32 1 The manufacturer's motion for summary judgment

was then granted. Though it is apparently dictum, there is interesting language in that portion of the court's decision
under New York law, which the court ultimately did not apply. The defendant had argued, with respectable authority,
that since both it and the plaintiff were large corporations
dealing in the aviation field, plaintiff was not in the position
of an average consumer so as to rely upon strict liability.322
The court volunteered its observation, however, that under
New York law no distinction had yet been made by the New
York Court of Appeals between ordinary consumers and commercial specialists.32 3
In In re Holiday Airlines Corp.,2 a bankruptcy action, the
Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court and held that Pacific
Propeller, Inc., the Washington aircraft repair company which
argued for the validity of a lien against the aircraft, could assert Washington law pertaining to aircraft liens. Under choice
of law rules, Washington was determined to be the state
where such a lien attached, and under the Federal Aviation
Act,32 5 Washington lien law was found to be the proper law by
which to test the validity of the lien. 26
The Florida Supreme Court recently retreated from the
3" 428 N.Y.S.2d at 399.
322

Id.

323

Id.

324

620 F.2d 731 (9th Cir. 1980).

49 U.S.C. § 1406 (1976). The court also held that the lien was enforceable in the
bankruptcy proceedings since it was filed with the FAA at a place designated under
the Federal rules as appropriate, citing section 1406 as authority. 620 F.2d at 735.
.2-

320

620 F.2d at 735-36 (applying

WASH. REV. CODE ANN.

§ 60.08.010 (West. 1961)).

But see Bitzer-Craft Motors, Inc. v. Pioneer Bank & Trust Co., 82 Ill. App. 3d 1, 401
N.E.2d 1340 (1980) (where, in a secured transaction case, the court held that while
the underlying validity of the aircraft title instruments filed with the FAA is to be
resolved under state law, the mere fact of filing such instrument pursuant to FAA
provisions is not the single determinative factor in resolving a priority dispute which
otherwise arises under applicable divisions of the UCC). See also Martin v. Heady,
103 Cal. App. 3d 580, 163 Cal. Rptr. 117 (1980) (the lien sales provisions of California's Aircraft Lien Law violated the procedural due process provisions of the California Constitution).
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strict lex loci delicti rule in the conflicts area and adopted the
most significant relationship test as set forth in the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws. In Bishop v. Florida Specialty Paint Co.,327 the court noted that, particularly in the
case of an aircraft accident in which the extraordinary mobility of aircraft was a consideration, the significant relationship
test was the most appropriate way to proceed in deciding
328
which law to apply.
C.

Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act
28 U.S.C. § 1441(d) provides in part:
(d) Any civil action brought in a State court against a foreign
state as defined in Section 1603(a) of this title may be removed
by the foreign state to the District Court of the United States
for the district and division embracing the place where such
action is pending. Upon removal, the action shall be tried by
the court without a jury.... 2 9

Thus, where an action subject to the act is removed to federal court pursuant to section 1441(d), the statute precludes
trial by jury. Where the action is originally filed under diversity jurisdiction, however, the thorny question has arisen concerning whether section 1441(d) precludes jury determination
of the case under the independent diversity ground of
jurisdiction.
The Southern District of New York in Herman v. El Al
Israel Airlines, Ltd.,8 0 dealt with a claim for personal injuries
falling under the commercial activity exclusion to immunity.
The case was originally filed in state court but was removed
by the defendant to the federal court pursuant to 1441(d),
15 Av. Cas. 18,490 (Fla. 1980). The following twenty-five states, as well as the
District of Columbia, have now rejected the lex loci delicti rule in favor of modern
approaches involving evaluation of multiple factors or contacts: Alaska, Arkansas,
California, Colorado, Florida, Illinois, Iowa, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York,
North Dakota, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Texas, Washington
and Wisconsin. Id. at 18,492 n.2.
318 Id. at 18,491.
.29 28 U.S.C. § 1441(d) (Supp. 1981).
"1 502 F. Supp. 277 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
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where the plaintiffs then asserted their right to trial by jury
under diversity jurisdiction. The court, openly acknowledging
the recent jurisprudence allowing trial by jury in similar circumstances when the action was originally filed in federal
court, 3 1 found section 1441(d) to be an unequivocal denial of
trial by jury in an action against a "foreign state," as defined
in the act, when the case is removed to the federal court from
a state forum. 32 The court also rejected the plaintiff's constitutional attack on the strictures of 28 U.S.C. section 1441(d)
under the Seventh Amendment, finding that at the time of
the Seventh Amendment's adoption in 1791, the doctrine of
Sovereign Immunity existed and barred suit against sovereign
governments. 33 3 Therefore, the court reasoned, the action
could not be a "suit at law" under the Seventh -Amendment,
3 34
for which trial by jury is preserved.
The case of Sugarman v. Aeromexico, Inc.33 5 illustrates the
''commercial activities" exception to the Foreign Sovereign
Immunities Act."3 In Sugarman, the plaintiff brought suit in
November of 1978 in Federal District Court in New Jersey
against Aeromexico, a corporation wholly owned by the Mexican government. The complaint alleged injury due to an unexplained fifteen hour delay in providing -transportation from
Aculpulco to the United States. Choosing to construe the exception to immunity contained in 28 U.S.C. section 1605(a)(2)
"expansively, the court reversed a summary judgment in favor
of the airline, finding that a sufficient nexus existed between
the plaintiff's grievance and the defendant's "commercial activity carried out in the United States. ' 33 7 The court based its
331 See, e.g., Rex v. CIA. Pervana De Vapores, S.A., 493 F. Supp. 459 (E.D. Pa.
1980); Cucullu v. MN Odessa, No. 78-3344 (E.D. La. Apr. 28, 1980); Lonon v. Companhia De Navegacao Lloyd Basileiro, 85 F.R.D. 71 (E.D. Pa. 1979); Icenogle v.
Olympic Airways, S.A., 82 F.R.D. 36 (D.D.C. 1979).
332502

F. Supp. at 279-80.

33 Id.
334

Id.

35 626 F.2d 270 (3d Cir. 1980).
36 28 U.S.C. § 1605 (Supp. 1981).
31,Id. at 273. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2) (Supp. 1981) provides in pertinent part:
(a) A foreign state shall not be immune from the jurisdiction of courts
of the U.S. or of the states of any case:
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decision on the fact that the plaintiff's delayed return trip was

bound for New York City and was a part of a package that
was purchased at a travel agency in New Jersey." 8
Despite Aeromexico's urging, the court refused to construe
the first clause of section 1605(a)(2) so as to predicate exclusion from immunity on the grounds that the alleged misconduct occurred in the United States. 9 The court found, instead, that Congress did not intend to limit liability for acts
carried out or having direct effects in the United States, and
accordingly, the exclusion provisions of liability limitation
were ruled applicable to acts performed outside the country.3 40 Where the acts complained of grew out of "a regular
course of commercial conduct" that is "carried on in the

United States,"'" the court found that the section 1605(a)(2)
exclusion applies. 4 2

338

(2) In which an action is based upon a commercial activity carried on
in the United States by the foreign State; or upon an act performed in
the United States in connection with a commercial activity of the foreign state elsewhere; or upon an act outside the territory of the U.S. in
connection with a commercial activity of the foreign state elsewhere
and that act causes a direct effect in the United States.
626 F.2d at 273.

339

Id.

340
341

Id.
Id.

34
Id. at 274-75. The court found that the Act included within its provisions the
principle that the immunity of a foreign state is restricted to suits involving a foreign
state's public acts, as opposed to its private acts. In transferring the determination of
sovereign immunity from the executive branch to the judicial branch, Congress
thereby avoided foreign policy implications inherent in executive immunity
determinations.

